The triumphant declaration of a despot's capture, a swift military operation, and the promise that vast oil reserves will fund the entire endeavour: for observers of US foreign policy, the recent events in Venezuela carry a chilling sense of déjà vu. As Donald Trump announces the seizure of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, analysts warn he is resurrecting the very myths that led to catastrophic failure and spiralling costs in Iraq.
The Hollow Victory of 'We Got Him'
The scene in Baghdad on 14 December 2003 remains iconic. US proconsul Paul Bremer announced the capture of Saddam Hussein with the phrase, "Ladies and gentlemen, we got him!" The moment was framed as a decisive turn in the Iraq war, a belief that proved to be profound wishful thinking as a brutal insurgency engulfed the country for years.
Watching Donald Trump's press conference at Mar-a-Lago on 3 January, where he detailed the attack on Venezuela and the capture of Nicolás Maduro, evoked that same flawed narrative. While lacking Bremer's pithy quote, Trump's triumphalist tone was unmistakable. "The dictator and terrorist Maduro is finally gone in Venezuela. People are free, they're free again," he declared, warning other Venezuelan leaders they could be next.
This pattern of celebrating the capture or killing of a leader as a conclusive victory has repeatedly led the US into protracted conflicts. The initial rush of a clean military operation gives way to a long, bloody, and destabilising hangover from regime change.
The Persistent Fantasy of a Self-Funding War
Perhaps the most dangerous parallel between the two interventions is the economic fantasy that an oil-rich nation can pay for its own occupation and reconstruction. This was a central myth peddled during the Iraq invasion. In 2003, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz told Congress Iraq's oil revenues could bring $50bn to $100bn in two to three years, claiming the country could "finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon."
This proved catastrophically wrong. Dilapidated infrastructure and instability meant Iraq's oil production did not return to pre-invasion levels until 2009. The ultimate cost to Washington has been staggering. The Costs of War project estimated in 2023 that the conflict in Iraq and related operations in Syria had cost nearly $2.9tn.
Undeterred by history, Trump is clinging to the same illusion for Venezuela. "It won't cost us anything because the money coming out of the ground is very substantial," he asserted. "We're going to get reimbursed for everything that we spend." He has repeatedly fixated on Venezuela's 300bn barrels of oil reserves, the largest in the world.
This ignores stark reality. Venezuela's oil infrastructure is crumbling, requiring an estimated $180bn investment over a decade to restore 1990s production levels of 3 million barrels per day. Current output is just a third of that. Furthermore, Trump's open desire to seize oil revenue strips away any veneer of benevolent intervention.
Repeating Strategic Blunders: The Peril of No 'Day After' Plan
Beyond the economic miscalculation, Trump's Venezuela policy echoes the Bush administration's failure to plan for the aftermath of regime change. In Iraq, officials like Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz undermined Pentagon planning and discarded the State Department's Future of Iraq Project.
Similarly, after Trump's declaration that the US would "run" Venezuela for a transitional period, Secretary of State Marco Rubio quickly backpedalled, suggesting the US role would be limited to enforcing an oil quarantine. This indicates a lack of coherent strategy for governance, polarisation, and potential political violence once Maduro was removed.
The interim Chavista regime under Delcy Rodríguez has already deployed armed militias across Caracas, signalling the potential for significant instability that a quick military strike cannot resolve.
While Venezuela is not Iraq, and the current intervention involves no immediate US troop occupation, the foundational errors are alarmingly familiar. By underestimating complexity, overestimating the power of a symbolic capture, and fantasising about easy oil wealth, Trump risks unleashing his own series of hollow "we got him" victories, unable to overcome the chaos of failed regime change.
